INTR OD U CTION
Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT), relatively new to the psychotherapeutic scene, is hailed with great hope and enthusiasm as a means of rapidly alleviatin g mental distress. Its practice is seen in some quarters, for example the U K public sector, as providing an altern ative to psychoanalytically orientated therapy that is more rational, quick and efficient , and regarded as of proven effica cy. This is simila r to the early idealisat ion of psychoanalysis, and may prove relatively short-lived . H owever, psychoanalysts need to take careful heed of this phenomenon, and be prepared to engage in debate about it, as it appears to be linked with a serious devaluation and erosion of the psychoanalytic perspective in health -care services worldwide.
I will compare and contrast the two clinical paradigms, the psychoanalytic and the cognitive-behavioural. I will show how CBT practitioners are beginning to rediscover the same phenomena that psychoanalysts earlier faced, and are having to change and deepen both their theory and practice accordingly, and to modify their expectatio ns. These rediscovered phenomena concern unconscious processes, the complexity of the internal world and the intrinsic difficulties of psychic change. The main originator of CBT, Aaron Beck, in his recent book about work with personality-disordered patients (Beck et al., 1990) , talks at times in a way reminiscent of the early Freud. Early psychoanalysis was itself more 'cognitive', and had to evolve to meet the challenges encountered in the psyche. We may find that CBT technique continues to become more 'analytic' as time goes by, and that accompanying this the need for longer and more complex trainin g of therapists, including substantial personal analysis, will be rediscovered. At least one major CBT training course in the U K in fact alrea dy recommends that trainees seek personal psychotherapy.
The stance of the therapist in CBT is a socially acceptable one, which makes immediate intuitive sense. The psychoanalytic stance is much harder to swallow, and is maintained against the resistance of both the analyst and the patien t. I will suggest that there is a constant tendency for 'decomposition' or collapse into something simpler during psychoanalytic work. The analyst is pushed constantly from without and within either into being more 'cognitive' or into a simpler counselling stance-in such ways the analytic stance is frequently in danger of being lost and having to be refound. When it can be achieved , the advantage is that through the discomfort and tension of the striving for analytic neutrality and abstinence, more disturbance becomes available in the room, within the therapeutic relatio nship itself, to be worked with and potentially transformed. CBT is far less disturbing and intrusive. It is worth noting that although it forfeits potential therapeutic power, it may be acceptable to some patien ts in a way that psychoanalytic therapy is not, protectin g privacy and defences that the individual has good reasons for wishing to preserve.
A second, related point is that 'integration' of analytic and cognitive methods in my view inevit ably produces something more cognitive than analytic. Once cognitive or behavioural parameters are introduced by the therapist, I will argue that an analytic stance essentially ceases to exist, and the analytic paradigm and methodology again collap se into the cognitive one, with a loss of potential therapeutic power. This is worth exploring in view of the huge current enthusiasm for so-called 'integrated ' treatments such as 'cognitive analytic therapy'.
One oft-quoted argument for offering CBT rather than psychoanalytic treatm ents to patien ts in the public sector is that there is so much more empirica l research evidence for its efficacy. It also on the surface appears cheaper, as it is brief and needs less training to apply. It is worth noting first of all that where patients have freedom to choose, in the private sector, only a minority opt for CBT, most patien ts preferring dynamic therapies. The alleged superior efficacy of CBT is also questionable empirically, and I will look briefly at the outcome research field in this connectio n.
COM PAR IN G PSYCH OAN ALYTIC AN D COG N ITIVE-BEH AVIOU RAL TH ER APY

H istory of the split from psychoanalysis
The biographical context for Freud's ideas is widely known, with important links between the ideas and Freud's personal experiences and his self-analysis. A similar context for Beck's ideas is less well-known and is worth outlining. Aaron T. Beck began as a psychoanalyst, graduating from the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute in 1956. H e becam e disillusioned and impatien t with the psychoanalytic culture in which he found himself over the following decades-in his view unfocused, resting on dubious theoretical foundations and insufficien tly located in the patient's current reality. Psychoanalysis was very much the dominant, authoritative culture in psychiatry (a situation radically different from that in the U K then or now). Beck, in opposition to this establishment model, founded first a 'cognitive theory' of depression, then derived a brief therapeutic approach. Perhaps, as is not uncommon, innovation arose through the combination of a particular personality and a rather rigid or too-comfortable state of affairs in psychoanalysis at one place and time.
Beck's biographer (Weishaar, 1993 ) notes that Beck is open about having developed his theory and technique not just through his clinical work, but, like Freud, through introspection and analysis of his own neurotic problems. Born in 1921, the youngest of a sibship of five, Beck was according to family mythology the one who had 'cured' his mother by being born. Elizab eth Beck had been depressed since the loss of her first child, a son, in infancy, followed later by the death of a young daughter in the 1919 influenza epidemic. D escribed as a powerful matriarchal figure, overshadowing the quieter father, she remained an explosive person, whose unpredictable and irrational moods the young Aaron found troubling. She is described as having been 'overprotective' of her youngest son, who spent months in hospital with a life-t hreaten ing illness at the age of 8.
Beck describes the way he systematically desensitised himself to a serious 'blood/injury phobia' during his medical training, treating his fears of heights, tunnels, public speaking and 'abandonment' with similar sorts of behavioural and cognitive strategies. H e also described curing himself of 'moderate depression'. H e is lukewarm about the effects of his training analysis. Weishaar quotes a colleagu e, Ruth G reenberg, as referring to Beck's restive rebelliou sness about the psychoanalytic establishment. G reenberg suggests that being his own authority and being in control of himself were of overriding importance to Beck, and would have made the analytic training very problematic for him.
In the decade following his qualification as an analyst, Weishaar relates how Beck carried out empirica l research into depression. Through examining the dreams of his depressed patients, he came to the conclusion that hypothesising wish-fulfilm ent and hidden motivatio n was unnecessary, and indeed in time he came to dispense with the idea of an unconscious in Freud's sense at all. H e also used more standard experiment al psychology procedures in his research. One experimen t involved a card-sorting test. The fact that depressed subjects did not react negatively to success in the task showed, Beck thought, that they did not have a need to suffer, and thus went towards disproving the psychoanalytic theory that depression was due to 'inverted hostility'. M any psychoanalysts might question this as a research paradigm for psychoanalytic concepts, isolated as it is from the context of a close interpersonal relatio nship. H owever I think it illustrates how great the conceptual differences sometim es are between practitioners of the two treat ments, which can lead to major difficulties in communication .
Beck began to develop a cognitive theory, and from that a cognitive therapy (CT) of depression. H e was influenced by Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory and by the idea that the patien t could become his or her own 'scientist' of the mind. H e was also influenced by the ideas of Adler, H orney and StackSullivan. Beck communicated with Albert Ellis who was independently developing RationalEmotive therapy, which shares some but not all of its features with cognitive therapy (Ellis, 1980) . Beck, together with Ellis and D onald M eichen baum (see e.g. M eichenbaum, 1985) , is regarded as one of the 'founding fathers' of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), an umbrella term which covers this broad therapeutic approach, and which, in the U K at least, is now used more or less synonymously with CT. 'Behavioural' acknowledges the contribution of learning theory and classica l behaviour therapy. I will continue to use the term CBT in this paper.
Early theories underpinning CBT were relatively simple, with little emphasis on the precise mechanism of symptom causality, simply that things had been 'mis-lea rnt' through childhood experience. The emphasis was rather on the way symptoms were currently mainta ined and underpinned by 'negative cognitions', which were in turn generated by maladaptive internal 'schemas'-deep cognitive structures organising experience and behaviour. (In recent years 'schemas' are seen in increasingly complex ways). Beck believed that discovering and challenging negative cognitions was a simpler, shorter path to change than psychoanalysis, and made more theoretical sense. H e saw himself as shifting away from the 'motivational' psychoanalytic model to an 'information processing' one-he directed attention away from 'why' on to 'how' distressed psychologica l functioning operates.
T he cognitive behavioural paradigm
In its classical form (Beck, 1979; H awton et al., 1989; M oorey, 1991) CBT is a short-term, structured, problem-solving method by which a patient is trained to recognise and modify the maladaptive, conscious thinking and beliefs that are, it is argued, maintaining his or her problems and distress. This treatmen t/trainin g is done first by educatin g the patient in the cognitive model of emotion, often with the help of written material. The patien t is then helped to recognise negative automatic thoughts, then encouraged to use a process of logical challenging and reality-test ing of thoughts, both in the session and in the form of between-session homework.
A vital feature of CBT is the sympathetic, collaborative therapeutic relation ship, in which the therapist tries to be an inspiring and imaginative trainer in self-help skills. The patien t is encouraged to become a scientific observer of himself and his or her thoughts, and to start to question the logical basis on which beliefs-for example, beliefs about being unlovable, or a failure-are held. Sessions are structured and directive, with the patien t and therapist focusing general complaints down on to specific negative cognitio ns which can then give rise to experimental tasks to be carried out, and the outcome monitored. Thus a depressed patien t is found, for example, to have core beliefs that no one is interested in her, and that everyone else is having a better life. These core beliefs are found to generate day-to-day thoughts like 'no one talks to me at parties', and 'other people have much more interesting jobs'. Such beliefs can be specifica lly tested out both during discussion in sessions (often through a sort of Socratic dialogue) and then through carefully planned homework involving observations and possibly behavioural tasks. This hypothetical patien t will be referred to again later.
The usual practice is to offer between ten and twenty sessions of treatm ent, with followup refresher sessions. Training required for the therapist is relatively brief, not requiring, for example, any personal therapy. Beck, however, stresses that it is far from enough for the therapist simply to learn a set of techniques-he/she needs to have an overall 'cognitive conceptualisation', and to have well-developed interpersonal skills and sensitivity. Weishaar notes that Beck's treatm ent manual for depression fails to capture the heart of his own empathic therapeutic style, as seen on videotapes. This observation will be returned to later, when discussing what factors may really be therapeutic in CBT.
Comparing the psychoanalytic paradigm
Contemporary psychoanalytic conceptualisation and clinical technique mostly differs from that of 1950s Philadelphia. Beck, who was sceptical about classica l drive theory, and the strong emphasis his psychoanalytic colleagues then placed on childhood reconstructions, might (or might not) have found a relatively active, 'here-and-now'-based objectrelatio ns approach more to his taste. Although familiar to most readers, I will lay out the basics of this contemporary psychoanalytic clinical paradigm so as to contrast it with the cognitive one. I approach this, I should say, from the traditional 'positivist' rather than an intersubjective 'constructivist ' paradigm-that is, I see the primary object of study and discovery as being the inner world of the patient. While acknowledging the biases caused by our 'irreducible subjectivity' (Renik, 1998) , I agree with D unn (1995) that this does not reduce us to total ignorance. Thus I see the analyst as doing his or her best, with an imperfect and biased observing instrument, to strive towards understanding of the internal world of the other.
The CBT stance is intuitive and socially acceptable-indeed it is a specialised form of a familia r tutorial relatio nship. The psychoanalytic stance is counterintu itive and less socially acceptable-much harder to swallow for both analyst and patien t. The therapist offers close empathic atten tion, but leaves the agenda to the patien t's free associations, becoming involved with the patien t as participa ntobserver in an unfolding relation ship. The analyst often has powerful wishes to respond naturally to the patient, to explain and to reassure. G iving way to such impulses relieves the analyst-it makes him or her feel nicer and kinder. In particular, it spares the analyst the moral reproach intrinsic in being the negative transference figure (M ilton, 2000) . The paradox is that although the analyst is apparently being more 'real', this is illusory. H e or she has in fact, by fitting in with the patien t's pressures, remained a transference object , and it is this familia r, relatively weak figure that the patien t is left with externally and internally (Feldman, 1993) . Collapse of the analytic stance has removed the potential for the analyst to become a truly surprising and new object (Baker, 1993) . This is a new object for internalisation, who can bear and reflect on the patien t's projectio ns, rather than quickly disowning them.
The analytic precepts of neutrality and abstinence do not as we know refer to coldness, but to a striven-for personal unobtrusiveness that allows the analyst to become clothed in whatever the patien t needs to bring. By reducing the extraneous 'noise' from one's own personality, a clearer field is provided for locating this. 'Live' emotional experiencing is allowed to occur, sometim es fraught, anxiety-provoking or painful for analyst, patien t or both. H owever, by activatin g distorted internal object relatio nships in a live way, they are potentially able to be explored and gradually altered by experience. In contrast to CBT, change promoted by psychoanalysis work is relatively independent of the conscious aspects of insight.
The analytic stance will frequently be lost, and have to be refound, as the analyst is subtly pulled into fulfilling the patien t's unconscious scripts (Sandler, 1976; Joseph, 1985) . There will be constant invitation s, which the analyst will often partly accept, to become more prescriptive, or educatio nal, more partisan, more emotionally reactive and so on. One could say that the patien t tries all the time to get the analyst to be a different sort of therapist-whether this is more of a humanistic counsellor, a gestalt therapist, a guru, a teacher or, what I think is quite common, the patient unconsciously nudging the analyst into providing a weak version of cognitive therapy itself. All these therapies, including cognitive therapy but with the one exception of psychoanalytic therapy, use therapeutic stances that come more naturally because they are specialised forms of ordinary social contact. So it is always hard work, and work against the grain, to observe the collapse of the analytic stance, work it through in the countertransference, and re-establish its counter-intuitiven ess and complexit y again.
In CBT, the set up is such that the patient and therapist talk together about a disturbed patien t they mostly only hear reported, and try to think, with the sensible patien t in the room, ways to make him or her feel, and be, more reasonable. The rational part of the self is strengthened, in order to get on top of the disturbance. This maintains, even strengthens, a division in the personality between rational and irratio nal, conscious and unconscious. Analytic conditions, by contrast, allow disturbed aspects of the patient to come right into the room, with all their passion and irratio nality, loving, hating, destroying and so on. The patien t is encouraged to project, challenge, disrupt, complain, involve the analyst in myriad ways in the psychic drama. Primitive and disturbing phantasies, involving both body and mind, may come to light.
The analyst, then, has the advantage of a much greater range of orientation s to the patien t, and aspects of the patien t, than the cognitive therapist has. Linked to this, an important but particularly intrusive feature of psychoanalysis is the analyst's frequent orientatio n towards what happens in the therapeutic relat ionship from an observing 'third position'. This triangularity can arouse the primitive feelings of oedipal exclusion which Britton (1989) describes. The analyst's reflect ive, independently thinking mind can seem an infuriatingly private, superior place where an excluding sort of 'mental intercourse' takes place. It is easier and more comfortable to flatten the triangle, to discuss things that are alrea dy visible, from a shared position, or to get together to discuss someone else. The 'collabo rative colleagu e' stance of CBT, together with a setting that does not invite live manifestation of disturbance, can avoid triangularity almost completely. I think this is a key issue in the difference. The psychoanalyst deliberately takes the risk at times of precipitatin g the patien t's narcissistic indignation or even rage, by speaking openly about things he or she sees that the patient cannot see, or half-sees and wants to keep hidden. Although this is uncomfortable for both, it means narcissistic parts of the personality are activated and may become gradually modified and integrated .
To consider now the case of the hypothetica l depressed patien t mentioned above who comes for help feelin g no one is interested in her, and that other people are having better lives. A psychoanalyst she consults will not actively encourage her to challenge and test this belief outside the room. Instead, a neutral, unstructured setting will be provided, in which the patient may quickly experience the analyst as uninterested, involved in his or her own thoughts, and speaking from a superior and privileged position-the analyst, like the people she meets outside, she believes to be having a much better and exciting time with other people, while she is left alone with an inferior sort of life. By not encouraging and reassuring, the analyst may quickly find him or herself the target of this patien t's miserable resentment. The nature and source of this resentment will become clearer, allowing it to be understood and questioned at a much deeper level. The patien t's envious misery may prove linked to childhood feelin gs of exclusion from the parents' relatio nship and from the mother's relationship with other siblings. The 'other room' from which one by definition is always excluded (Britton, 1998) may, for many people, become idealised in a way that empties their own life of meaning, and halts the process of separation and independence. This deep sense of 'oedipal exclusion' may be linked to both childhood deprivations and a particular difficulty with toleratin g separateness and difference. CBT is unlikely to reveal or to be able to address such complex dynamics.
It is certainly true that psychoanalysts reason with their patien ts, explain to them, make practica l suggestions, and so on. Often, for example, I think this happens at the end of a bit of painful or stormy work in the transference. A narcissistic aspect of the patien t has been finally understood and integrated (in K leinian terms, for example, a move towards the depressive position) and the patien t is thoughtful, curious and collaborative about what has happened and how it relates to current and past relatio nships. I think this is often the organising and contextualising phase of a piece of work, which is in many ways a final 'cognitive' phase. At other times, though, I think analysts become 'cognitive' as a short circuit, to avoid a painful but necessary bit of emotional experiencing. Thus a self-observing eye is needed, so the analyst can question whether he or she is beginning to sound very reasonable and sensible, trying to persuade the patien t of some bit of reality, or push the patien t into certa in action. One might ask oneself at this point whether there is a wish to be seen as a good, blameless object-in which case it is worth wondering what form the bad object would take at this point that would feel so unbearable. It might also be that there is a larger picture to be seen in the transference and countertra nsference that is being missed. I will illustrate this latter possibility with the case of M r A.
M r A
A 45-year-old man who was still living with his parents, working in a clerica l job far below his capabilit ies, M r A came to analysis for help to move on. H e inter mittent ly would come to a session in a particularly thinking and constructive mood, wanting help with a particular plan for change-such as learning to drive, applying for a new job, buying his own flat and so on. I would feel encouraged and pleased for him, because he really was miserably stuck. I would join him in trying to analyse his difficulties with these tasks, linking things in, when I could, with the transference relation ship and troublesome past relatio nships, in an ordinary sort of way. In subsequent sessions M r A would have become very anxious and doubtful about the change. H e would start to spin it all out-he would have a form to fill in but leave it at work, or lose it; he would tell me about a necessary phone call being put off, and so on, making sure I knew every stage of the postponement. H e would still seem to want help with his fears. The nature of the scene-setting followed by the delays was such that I was often left with a very strong sense of thwarted desire.
At first I would find myself full of sensible and practical ideas and strategies for helping M r A to challenge his fears, and (with a guilty sideways look towards my own analytic superego) I would slip into making interpretatio ns which were really disguised practical suggestions, like 'it is interestin g that you don't seem to feel that you could …' At this stage we would enter, as I came to see, a 'cognitive' mode that was ultim ately unproductive. M r A would passively seem to accept my cognitive and behavioural suggestions, but continue to let the project slide. As M r A became flatter and more passive, I would find myself more and more lively. I would now perhaps analyse his resistance in ter ms of his rebellio us attit ude to me, or to his disowning and projectio n of his mind into me, or maybe in terms of his internal conflict. N othing would happen-that is, M r A would still report to me flatly or hopelessly, or sometimes a tinge triumphantly, that he had still not done anything about the project. I would sometim es feel pushed beyond endurance at this stage. If I could not contain my countertransference, I would hear myself making a rather sharp and impatient interpretat ion about M r A's passivity. In response, he would become either very weak and demoralised, or alter natively subtly excited and mocking. H e would typically report dreams at times like these, in which someone was pursued or intimidated by gangsters or con men-it was often unclea r which side he was on in these dreams.
By repeated ly working through these situations with M r A, I came to understand a complex internal situation in which he was both trapped by, and took revenge upon, a monstrous internal figure which was partly a version of a very abusive stepmother. I came to see my 'cognitive' impulses as part of a larger picture in which we as an analytic couple enacted a sado-masochistic scenario that both trapped M r A but also fulfilled a wish and need for a timeless infantile-like dependence on archaic objects. In phantasy, he seemed to have lodged himself inside me, projectin g his active mind in a very wholesale way. M ovement could only occur at times when I could get outside the situation, see the whole picture, and interpret it in a non-retaliato ry way that M r A could become really interested in, and concerned about. This work used to test my analytic capacit y to the full, but it eventually enabled M r A to experience his own mind more fully. This meant him having to face and mourn his own situation, internal and external, and experience his rage, guilt, sadness and ultim ately his own considerable strength.
In my work with M r A I was thus periodically nudged into doing fragments of a weak version of CBT. This illustrates what I mean by 'collapse' of the analytic stance into something simpler and more apparently common-sense. It will inevitably occur in our work from time to time, and it needs hard work in the countertransference to notice and rebuild the tension and complexity inherent in productive analytic work.
Comparing modes of learning in the psychoanalytic and cognitive-behavioural paradigms
We know that both psychoanalysis and CBT involve learning. The main sort of learning hoped for in psychoanalysis is learning from emotional experience. This may be, for example, finding that one's worst fears in a relat ionship are not confirmed, or, when they are, that the experience can be survived and thought about. CBT therapists also hope their patients will learn from experience. The whole point of homework experimen ts is that the patient can test out distorted preconceptions outside the session. Some cognitive therapists, nowadays, may even say to the patien t, 'and can't you see how you're doing it with me too?' The analytic patien t can, however, learn something quite subtle and complex through understanding, containment, repeated experimen t and sustained experience within the therapeutic relatio nship, that (for example in M r A's case) giving up a dependent, sado-masochistic way of relat ing involves both some loss and a new sort of loneliness but also a new freedom and independence of thought and action .
Implicit in CBT is that if one pays attention to modifying the patien t's conscious distortions of reality, or 'dysfunctional assumptions', over a brief period, the deeper structures generating such assumptions will dissipate, or become far less powerful. Psychoanalysts are more sanguine about this. A patien t M s B may be relieved and encouraged to find as a result of a courageous homework exercise that her actual family are pleased about her applying for promotion at work. H owever, after a short remission she remains plagued and seriously inhibited in her life by a nightmarishly caricatured inner mater nal figure who is weak, ill and reproachful if her daughter leaves her own depression and self-doubt behind-it feels at a deep level as if she is 'abandoning' the mother. Another patien t M r C, who fears (he knows irrationally) that sexual intercourse will somehow damage either himself or the woman, may be able to reality-test his fears behaviourally only to a very limited extent. U nconsciously his childhood fury about being left out of his parents' bedroom and their smugly exclusive relationship, leading to a phantasy of violent intrusion into his mother's body, means that he superstitiou sly fears he will damage the woman, and/or provoke atta ck from an internal nightmarishly vengeful phantasy couple.
H aving said this, cognitive therapists argue cogently for the effica cy of CBT in combating vicious cycles of symptom generatio n. Thus someone who suffers from panic attacks which are ultimately generat ed, say, by fearful unconscious phantasies is often then subject to further spiralling hypochondriacal fear at the feelings of breathlessness and palpitat ions generated . CBT can be very helpful in modifying such positive feedback loops in symptom generation . H owever, one would predict a less radical and enduring effect from CBT than from psychoanalytic work which would aim in such a situation to address structures earlier in the causal chain.
Psychoanalysis has shed light on some barriers we have to learning. Learning certain fundamental truths about self and others is a complex process-both sought after but also desperately hated and resisted (M oney-Kyrle, 1968) . It is hard to give up feeling omnipotent, the centre of the universe, rather than dependent on others, and fully to know we are the product of a couple who came together outside our control, and have minds that are separate and different from ours. This involves the triangularity I have referred to. Psychoanalytic research shows how very active a part we play in what we learn or mis-lea rn all our lives, and that this is the product of both environment and constitution. An implicit message in much CBT (but mostly not in psychoanalytic) writing is that somehow the therapist should be able simply to transcend and transform the patien t's maladaptive internal schemas by being a good, reasonable person. This view of human nature sees the applicat ion of reason and the right external conditions as sufficien t for healin g. The assumption is that the patien t is simply a good and reasonable victim of mis-understanding and neglect . M ost psychoanalysts, in contrast, see man as subject to complex internal conflicts and strong tendencies towards unreasonableness-all needing to be understood and addressed in detail. This difference in philosophy, often unstated, has important clinical implicatio ns.
The factors that psychoanalysts suggest make learning so difficult may mean that certain patients will simply not be able to tolerate the sort of knowing and understanding that psychoanalysis offers. They will neither want it nor be accessible to it. In such cases it would be arrogant (as well as pointless) for a psychoanalytic therapist to attempt to impose such treatment. A patien t must be free to choose a collab orative, less ambitious and more directly education al approach that will not threaten needed defences. In a good assessment, one will hopefully be able to gauge how much intrusion a patien t welcomes or is prepared to tolerate. This will mean for example that psychoanalytic psychotherapists in the public sector, funded to work only once a week with very disturbed patien ts, may find themselves introducing more cognitive parameters, and in effect collapsing the analytic stance. This collapse at least partially deprives the patient of a full opportunity to work in the negative transference-to project the very worst things in his or her internal world into the therapeutic relatio nship. Thus one does limit the scope of the work that can be done. A therapist might judge with a particular patien t that this is wise, as these terrible things might simply not be able to be contained within the limited setting availab le. H owever, I think it is always worth questioning this, and for the therapist to ask him or herself whether it is really the patien t being spared or the therapist-is one underestim ating the patien t's capacity to bear things, and avoiding an attack the patien t really needs an opportunity to make?
There may be clinical reasons for knowingly collapsin g the tension of the analytic stance in this way with particular patien ts, but collap se may also be part of ongoing debates and dialectics within the profession of psychoanalysis at different times and places. Abstinence and neutrality that harden into rigidity and arrogance may prompt some analysts to espouse 'human warmth' and experiment anew with gratificat ion of the patien t's infantile wishes. The pitfalls opened up by such an approach carried to extremes may then in turn provoke a countermovement. Partial collapses of analytic tension in one direction or another may become institutio nalised in particular approaches. One analyst's collap se may be another's flexible and innovative experimen t, and the debate thus launched may be creative within psychoanalysis, providing necessary challenges to stagnation. M oves towards more 'reasonable' and socially acceptable approaches may also be less creative, and related to analysts' own inevitable ambivalen ce about analysis and impatien ce with its slowness; its failure to live up to earlier, idealistic expectation s.
'INTEGR ATION ' OF PSYCH OAN ALYTIC AN D COG N ITIVE TH ER APIES
A number of psychotherapists believe you can combine all the advantages of the different techniques without losing power. Thus for example 'cognitive-a nalytic therapy' (CAT) (Ryle, 1990 ) is a brief, flexible approach where the patient is encouraged to think about themselves and their relatio nships and to formulate and monitor, with the therapist, what is habitually going wrong. The therapist may use classical CBT approaches such as encouraging the patien t to keep a symptom diary and make homework experimen ts, while at the same time interpreting transference phenomena as they arise. The patien t's resistances to diary keeping and other tasks often (for example) quickly provide material for work in the transference.
CAT sessions are less structured than classical CBT sessions, and unconscious as well as conscious meanings are certa inly sought, but CAT has certain hallm ark structural features. There is, as in CBT, reading matter for the patien t, and stress on early collaborative written formulation of the problems. The formula-tions can be referred back to when problems arise in the transference relatio nship or when difficulties outside are discussed. Another writing task is that both patien t and therapist are supposed to write each other 'goodbye letters' expressing their views about the therapy as it comes to an end. Ryle (1995) describes CAT as a very useful and safe first intervention for patients referred for outpatient psychotherapy (in the U K health service).
Ryle (1995) regards the transference as a 'hardy plant' arising whatever one does, and certa inly not requiring the therapist to be inactive. H e regards the collaborative stance of CAT as less potentially dangerous than psychoanalysis, which he sees as placing the patient in quite a powerless position (Ryle, 1994) . I agree with Ryle that bad psychoanalysis has more potential for har m than bad CAT. This is because conditions are created such that the 'hardy plant' of transference can flourish in a much fuller, often more disturbing way, much as the pot plants of colder clim es become the bushes and trees of the tropics. In addition, many plants will not even germinate outside the tropics, and there will be important aspects of the transference and countertransference which will not come to light at all in the setting of CBT or CAT, which, in spite of superficia l appearances to the contrary, I think have a fundamental similarity to each other and difference from a psychoanalytic approach. The therapist's active assertion of the benign colleague/teacher stance in CAT, as in CBT, and the structured nature of the work, help to limit the patien t's regression, and the nature and intensity of the transference. This makes them on the whole safer therapies for relatively unskilled therapists to perform.
H owever, I think the same factors which limit the potential for harm and abuse to the patient in CAT and CBT also limit the potential power for good of the treatmen ts, precisely because they restrict the nature and depth of the transference and countertransference. In both, a limit is put on the power and stature, both positive and negative, which the therapist can potentially have in the transference. The oedipal exclusion dynamic can be avoided or swiftly collapsed by the ready availability of cognitive escape routes-again, triangularity is bypassed. H owever CAT, like CBT, will for these reasons be more accessible and userfriendly on initia l contact, and will engage a greater variety of patien ts.
I think another linked and important limitation of both CAT and CBT, as compared with the analytic approach, is the therapist's nonneutral alignment in CAT and CBT with the ideal of 'progress'. Through the introduction of explicit tasks, pressure and expectatio n on the patien t is implicit from the outset, in however gentle and understanding a form it might be couched, to conform and to improve. I think this makes good CBT and CAT both more paternalistic than good analysis, and introduces a subtle moral restrictiven ess through its very reasonableness and friendliness.
Questions have also been raised (e.g. Scott, 1993) about the rather functionalist and benign model of the mind and of internal relation ships which underpins CAT (and indeed to my mind CBT). The possibility of truly establishing and mainta ining a task-orientated therapeutic alliance in deeply troubled and self-defeating patien ts seems too easily assumed. I think it is important for the therapist to be aware of the limitatio ns of an approach such as CAT, and to be sensitive to some patients' longing and need for something more and different. As indeed with psychoanalysis, there is a danger of partisan idealisatio n of one's own approach, without appreciatio n of both its advantages and its limitatio ns.
TH E R ED ISCOVER Y OF TR AN SFER EN CE AN D RESISTAN CE IN CBT
I have argued that CAT (and other similar 'integrated ' approaches) may be much nearer in their conceptualisation to modern CBT than to psychoanalysis, in spite of their attentio n to the unconscious and use of the transference. I think this is becoming more obvious as CBT moves into the treatm ent of personality disor-der, and becomes itself more experiential and emotive and concentrates more on the therapeutic relation ship. Beck himself has recently stated that CBT is an 'integrat ive therapy' par excellence (Beck, 1991) .
Cognitive theory is evolving into something less mechanistic and more 'constructivist'-concerned with how the patien t constructs reality. This moves from an idea of the therapist imposing their own 'rationality' on the patien t. A number of authors (e.g. Power, 1991) have noted a 'psychoanalytic drift' in the practice of cognitive therapy, just as there was a 'cognitive drift' in the practice of behaviour therapy. Something a bit more object-related is seeping into schema theory also, via a flourishing of interest in Bowlby's ideas about attachment amongst cognitive theorists (e.g. Liotti, 1991) . According to Weishaar (1993) , there is active debate amongst cognitive theorists at the moment as to 'whether clinical deficit s are cognitive or interpersonal in nature' (p. 125). H owever, in spite of this apparent 'analytic drift', I differ from Bateman (2000) in believin g that the cognitive clinical paradigm remains fundamentally different from the psychoanalytic one, and that true rapprochement is more apparent than real. An examination of the way modern CBT therapists modify their technique will, I hope illustrate, this.
Alongside evolution in theory, therapists (e.g. Beck et al., 1990 ) now suggest modifications to standard CBT technique when working with personality-d isordered patien ts. They include careful attentio n to the relat ionship between patien t and therapist, which, if it is not addressed, can lead to losing the patien t prematurely, or the therapy getting stuck. The patien t (we are told for example) will not want to mention his or her troubling negative thoughts about the therapist, and instead will go silent, or show in other ways that something is being resisted, like pausing, clenching fists, stammering, changing the subject. To quote Beck: 'When questioned the patien t may say, "It's not important, it's nothing". The therapist should press the patien t nonetheless' (Beck et al., 1990, p. 65) . This is reminiscent of Freud's early 'pressure technique', when he would insist that the patient tell him what was in their mind, however much they would prefer not to. Freud describes (Breuer & F reud, 1895) how it is often the most significa nt things that are withheld from the physician, though the patien t insists that they are insignifican t. In other ways, too, I think CBT can be seen as recreatin g earlier forms in the history of psychoanalysis. After all, at first Freud tried to cure patien ts using a simple cathartic method, and his initial attemp ts at dealin g with transference were by explaining it to the patien t as an archaic residue.
G iving a wealth of case examples, Beck describes how treatmen ts have to be longer, and sometimes more than once a week. H is therapeutic optimism is more guarded than before, and he talks of the difficulty of researching these longer-term more complex treatmen ts using the controlled trial format, suggesting that one should value single case studies and clinical experience much more. (This might strike psychoanalysts, who are often criticised for doing just this, as a bit ironic.) H e talks about the importance of getting to know about the patient 's total life, and exploring their childhood, and not just focusing down too much, or too prematurely, on cognitio ns and tasks. H e stresses the importance of here-and-now affective experience, and the use of experiential techniques.
Beck points out that for the patien t to reexperience relatio nship difficulties in relat ion to the therapist may be useful and 'grist to the mill'. H owever, in contrast to the analytic approach, the therapist is supposed swiftly to challenge these negative transference phenomena, in order to re-establish a benign working relatio nship. Beck says one should: 'be in the role of friend and advisor', 'draw on one's own life experience and wisdom' in order to 'propose solutions' and 'educate the patien t regarding the nature of intimate relation ships', and become a 'role model' for the patient (p. 66). From the psychoanalytic angle, although the psychoanalyst may indeed at times be seen as a role model by the patien t in the transference, one tries as an analyst to analyse rather than accept this sacrifice of the patient's autonomy. Analysts might see Beck's statem ent as claiming some unwarranted superiority over patients in knowing how a life should be lived. The following quotatio n from Beck perhaps illum inates this assumption, by illustrating the simple 'deficit' model assumed in CBT, which requires the therapist to be a sort of teacher of life-skills: 'This process of re-educatio n is particularly important in treatin g patien ts with borderline personality disorder, whose own personality deficits may have prevented them from acquiring and consolidat ing many of the basic skills of self-control and stable relatio ns with others' (p. 66).
Beck, in this recent work, refers frequently to disappointment, frustration and other negative feelin gs that will be induced in the therapist by these difficult patients. H e stresses the importance of supervision in such cases, and also refers now and again in the book to the idea of the therapist dealin g with his negative feelings and impulses towards the patien t by keeping a 'dysfunctional thought record' of his own. Although Beck makes no mention of it, there is some indication nowadays that trainee CBT therapists are entering personal psychotherapy more often, albeit on a non-intensive basis, as an aid to their work. It seems to me that this has to be a logical progression of these new (re)discoveries in CBT. Without personal analysis, for example, most people are illequipped to make sustained clinical use of their countertransference rather than enactin g it.
EMPIRICAL R ESEAR CH COM PAR IN G PSYCH O-AN ALYTIC AN D COG N ITIVE TH ER APIES
U nfortunately, both professional rivalries and political pressures mean that something of a 'horse race' mentality can enter into the empirica l comparison of outcome in cognitive and psychoanalytic treatmen ts. Competition for scarce resources, for example in the U K public sector, can mean that clinician s using the different methodologies are eager to prove that their brand of treatm ent is more efficacious than the other. There are indication s that clinician s of different temperament tend to be drawn towards the different modalities (Arthur, 2000) , making it hard for each to appreciate both the value of the other's way of working and the limitat ions of their own.
One oft-quoted argument for offering CBT rather than psychoanalytic treatm ents to patien ts in the public sector is that there is so much more empirica l research evidence for its efficacy. It is also asserted as being cheaper, as it is brief and needs far less training to apply. CBT, as a brief, focused therapy, lends itself well to the popular randomised controlled trial (RCT) format, which has been repeated ly and enthusiastica lly undertaken, albeit often not with typical outpatient population s (Enright, 1999) . Outcome measures are usually in the form of simple symptom scores, and follow-up periods short.
Psychoanalysis itself, of course, requires four-or five-tim es-weekly sessions over some years; one often sees radical changes in the patien t's relatio nships, work capacity and creative fulfilm ent, over and above 'symptom relief '. Such outcome criteria are difficult and complex to measure, though progress is being made in this area of 'objective measurement of the subject ive' (Luborsky et al., 1986; Barber & Crits-Cristoph, 1993; H obson & Patrick, 1998) . Psychoanalytic psychotherapy as it is typically constrained within the public sector uses the same methodology, usually on a onceweekly basis over one or several years, and expects to foster the same sorts of changes to a lesser degree. M y view is that what I was describing earlier-the striving towards the tension of the analytic stance-characterises the psychoanalytic approach, whether it is carried out once or five times a week, and whether it is brief or long term. The vital factor to my mind is that for a therapist to be able to establish and maintain an analytic stance requires training on a very intensive, experiential and long-ter m basis.
When attem pts are made to fit psychoanalytic work into the extrem ely atypical sixteen-session format suited to CBT, most psychoanalysts would not predict more than symptomatic change, or a temporary alteratio n in surface cognitions, as there is no opportunity for vital working through. Thus one might expect the efficacy of very brief psychoanalytic psychotherapy to resemble that of CBT. This is borne out in the relat ively few circum stances where good quality comparative trials of CBT and brief psychoanalytic psychotherapy have been carried out-there is found to be essentially no difference in outcome (Crits-Cristoph, 1992; Luborsky et al., 1999) .
One study attem pting to link process and outcome in brief cognitive and dynamic therapies has suggested, interestingly, that it is the more typically 'dynamic' elemen ts of therapy that are important (Jones & Pulos, 1993) . These authors expected to find that cognitive therapy worked via cognitive procedures and dynamic therapy through dynamic ones. Instead they observed that 'evocatio n of affect', 'bringing troublesome feelin gs into awareness', and 'integratin g current difficulties with previous life experience, using the therapist-patien t relation ship as a change agent' (p. 315) all predicted improvement in both therapies. This was in contrast to the more typically 'cognitive' procedures of 'control of negative affect through the use of intellect and rationality' and 'encouragemen t, support and reassurance from therapists', (p. 315) which were not predictive of positive outcome.
Jones & Pulos suggest that all such treatments work via the provision of a unique, safe context within which relatio nships with the self and the world can be explored. They are aided by privilegin g emotional experience over rationality, and by emphasis on developmental history. According to this study at least, in so far as cognitive therapists take a 'rationalist' approach, in which affect is conceptualised and treated as the expression of irratio nal and unrealistic beliefs, and in so far as they view their role as one of imparting technical instruction and guidance, the therapy appears to be less successful. Another study comparing process in 'dynamic-interpersonal' and cognitivebehavioural therapies (Wiser & G oldfried, 1996) looked specifically at the types of interventions made in sections of sessions the experienced therapists themselves deemed changepromoting for their patient s. Again, these researchers noted an unexpected tendency in the cognitive therapists towards both using and valuing more 'dynamic' techniques, and suggest that this is part of the recent shift in CBT towards a more interpersonal focus.
When we research outcome in more typical length psychoanalytic treat ments, the 'gold standard' RCT format, which works reasonably well for brief therapy, poses huge logistical problems and may be quite inappropriate (G alatzer-Levy, 1995; G underson & G abbard, 1999) . We are dealin g with a complex interpersonal process involving multip le variables. Controls may become impossible to achieve and randomisation is a questionable activity in comparative trials where patien ts show marked preferences or aptitudes for different ways of working. The relative dearth of RCT evidence for the efficacy of psychoanalytic work is a function of the huge difficulties involved in researching typical psychoanalytic treatmen ts in this way, and is often falsely equated with 'evidence against' (Parry & R ichardson, 1996) .
H aving said this, there is a growing body of empirical research concerning more typical length public sector psychoanalytic psychotherapy in adults and children (e.g. M oran et al., 1991; Sandahl et al., 1998; Bateman & Fonagy, 1999; G uthrie et al., 1999) . Taken together with studies of psychoanalysis itself, the hardest of all to research, evidence begins to emerge that these lengthy, more ambitious treatmen ts may indeed offer important additional benefit. Fonagy et al., (1999) have collected and critically reviewed fifty-five studies of psychoanalytic outcome. These authors, although they expose many methodological limitatio ns in the data, adopt overall what they term a 'cautiously optimistic' attitu de to psychoanalytic outcome given the evidence available. Key provisional findings (which are fully referenced in the work itself) include the following: (1) intensive psychoanalytic treatmen t is generally more effective than psychoanalytic psychotherapy, the difference sometimes only becoming evident years after treat ment has ended, this applying particularly to the more severe disorders. (2) Longer-ter m treatm ent has a better outcome, as does completed analysis. (3) There are findings that suggest psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy are cost-beneficial and perhaps even cost-effective, and that psychoanalysis can lead to a reduction in other health-ca re use and expenditure, although one study suggests an increa se. (4) Psychoanalytic treatm ent appears to improve capacity to work, to reduce borderline personality disorder symptomatology, and may be an effective treatm ent for severe psychosomatic disorder.
SUM M AR Y AN D CON CLU SION S
I have tried to show how I see the CBT paradigm as a useful but less complex paradigm than the psychoanalytic one, limited in its explanatory power and in ter ms of the change its therapeutic applicatio n can be expected to achieve. Its far less intrusive and threatenin g nature will, however, make it more accep table for a number of patients. I have also tried to show how there is a strong attra ction towards working in a 'cognitive' way, for both psychoanalyst and patien t, and that the inherent tension and complexity of the analytic stance is constantly on the brink of decomposing, or collapsing, sometim es resulting in a weak version of cognitive therapy taking place. H owever, if the tension of psychoanalytic work can be borne by both patien t and analyst, the reward can be experiential, emotional learning by the patien t, which is likely to be deeper and more enduring than purely cognitive learning.
I have also suggested that, because psychoanalysts and cognitive-beh avioural therapists share the same field of study, they are increasingly going to discover the same clinical phenomena, and indeed are now doing so, although they may then approach these phenomena in fundamentally different ways. It is important, I think, both that the shared endeavour is recognised, to relieve the misery of psychic suffering, and also the differences, which will have important implicat ions for which patien ts are treated , in what way, and with what aims. It is unfortunate that clinicia ns from the two groups are currently often pushed by external economic pressures to compete with one another in the public sector, which exacerb ates the innate rivalries that are bound to exist between practit ioners of two such very different sorts of treat ment.
The select ed empirica l evidence I have quoted gives some interesting indicatio ns as to shared therapeu tic factors in brief psychodynamic and cognitive therapies. In the relat ively few instances in which co mparative studies of CBT and very brief psychodynamic therapy have been carried out, there is found to be essentially no difference in outcome. This should be no surprise to a psychoanalyst, as we would not predict deep and lasting change in inner world structures without considerable opportunity for working through. We might, in fact, be rather surprised and impressed that psychodynamic therapy does as well as CBT under such circumstances. The claim s I made earlier in the paper about psychoanalysis as a method facilit ating deep and lasting change certa inly need substantiatin g empirically rather than simply asserting, and I think we are not yet able to do this with confidence and in detail. H owever, research evidence of the last couple of decades is beginning to confirm analysts' expectations that intensive and long-term psychoanalytic treatmen ts have something substantial to offer over and above what brief treatm ents, whichever the modality used, can provide.
TRANSLATION S OF SU M M AR Y
L'auteur suggère que l'enthousiasme contemporain apporté à la thérapie cognitive-comportementale reflète notre désir de soulager rapidement et rationnellement la souffrance psychologique. La compétition présente dans le monnaiement menace la présence de la psychanalyse dans le secteur publique. L'auteur comparent les modèles psychanalytiques et cognitifs-comportementaux et souligne la richesse relative du paradigme psychanalytique. Elle montre que le modèle cognitif est sens commun, mais moins complexe et possède moins de potentiel explicatif et a moins de pouvoir thérapeutique. Elle montre la façon dont la sphère analytique subit toujours la pression de 's'effondre' en des modes plus simples, dont l'un ressemble au mode cognitif. Ceci apparaît aussi inévitablement dés lors que l'on s'efforce d' 'intégrer' les deux modèles. Les traitements cognitifs et 'intégrés ont néanmoins l'avantage d'être moins envahissants et donc plus acceptables pour certains patients. L'auteur traite du processus empirique et du résultat de la recherche cognitive et des thérapies psychanalytiques. Des thérapies brèves de l'un ou l'autre des modèles ont des résultats proches et modestement bons, et il semble que cela soit du plus à des éléments dynamiques du traitement que du à des éléments cognitifs de ce dernier. Des études formelles sur le résultat des psychothérapies psychanalytiques typiques et sur la psychanalyse elle même commencent à montrer que ces traitements longs et complexes sont efficaces dans la manière plus compréhensive prédite par le modèle. Nach M einung der Autorin reflektiert der heutige Enthusiasmus für kognitive Verhaltenstherapie unsere Sehnsucht nach schneller, rationaler H ilfe für seelisches Leiden. Der Wettstreit um finanzielle M ittel bedroht die psychoanalytische Präsenz im öffentlichen Sektor. D as psychoanalytische M odell und das Modell der kognitiven Verhaltenstherapie werden einander gegenübergestellt, und der relative R eichtum des psychoanalytischen Paradigmas wird dargelegt. Nach M einung der Autorin entspricht das kognitive M odell dem allgemeinen Menschenverstand, ist aber weniger komplex und seine potentielle erklärende und therapeutische K raft ist geringer. Sie diskutiert, wie die analytische Haltung immer unter D ruck ist, zu einfacheren M odalitäten "zusammenzufallen", von denen eine der kognitiven ähnelt. D ies geschieht nach ihrer M einung unvermeidlicherweise auch, wenn man versucht, die zwei Modelle zu "integrieren". K ognitive und "integrierte" Behandlungen haben andererseits den Vorteil, dass sie weniger tief eindringen und dadurch für manche Patienten akzeptabler sind. Ausgewählte empirische Prozess-und Outcome-F orschung von kognitiven und psychoanalytischen Behandlungen wird diskutiert. K urztherapien haben ähnliche, mässig gute Ergebnisse in beiden Richtungen, wobei es einige Evidenz gibt, dass dies mehr auf "dynamischen" als auf "kognitiven" Behandlungselementen beruht. Formale Outcome-Studien von typischerer psychoanalytischer Psychotherapie und Psychoanalyse weisen dahin, dass diese langen und komplexen Behandlungen in der umfassenderen Weise effektiv sind, wie sie das M odell voraussagt.
La autora sostiene que el entusiasmo actual por la terapia cognitivo-conductual refleja nuestros intensos deseos de lograr que el alivio del sufrimiento psíquico sea rápido y basado en la lógica. Las rivalidades económicas ponen en peligro la presencia del psicoanálisis en el sector público. Se contrasta el modelo psicoanalítico con el cognitivo-conductual, subrayándose la mayor riqueza del primero. La autora opina que el modelo cognitivo, aunque tiene su lógica, es menos complejo, tiene menos posibilidades explicativas y menores posibilidades terapéuticas. Estudia cómo la postura psicoanalítica está siempre bajo presión y a punto de resquebrajarse, para acercarse a modelos más sencillos, uno de los cuales suele ser el cognitivo. Según la autora, esto ocurre, inevitablemente, cuando se hace un intento por 'integrar' ambos modelos. Los tratamientos cognitivos e 'integrados' tienen la ventaja de que son menos intrusivos y, por lo tanto, mejor aceptados por algunos pacientes. Se analizan los métodos empíricos y los resultados de algunas investigaciones. Las psicoterapias breves de cualquier tipo pueden tener un resultado parecido y relativamente bueno. Y es evidente que, en tales casos, se basan más en elementos dinámicos que en elementos cognitivos. Estudios más profundos sobre los resultados de las psicoterapias psicoanalíticas más típicas y del mismo psicoanálisis empiezan a indicarnos que esos tratamientos, largos y complejos, son eficaces en un sentido más completo, ya pronosticado por el modelo.
